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1. Introduction
The purpose of this work is to study mean field games and mean field type control problems of
linear quadratic type, primarily those motivated by a certain kind of application to economics, the
quintessential example being the production of an exhaustible resource. Let us recall that mean
field game theory was introduced by the parallel works of Caines, Huang and Malhame´ [40] and
of Lasry and Lions [45, 46, 47], with a general aim to study the interactions of large populations
of rational actors. A mean field game refers essentially to an equilibrium which occurs when the
strategy employed by a representative agent of a given crowd is optimal given the costs imposed
by that crowd. A useful overview of the topic can be found in the notes of Cardaliaguet [14] based
on the lectures of Lions at the Colle`ge de France [51]. For an introduction to both theory and
applications of mean field games, see especially the Paris-Princeton Lectures of Gue´ant, Lasry and
Lions [35]. See also the survey by Gomes [29]. For a probabilistic analysis of mean field games,
see Carmona and Delarue [20]. We also mention that numerical methods have been important in
the development of mean field game theory; see especially Achdou and Cappuzzo-Dolcetta [3] and
Achdou, et al. [2].
A related but distinct concept is that of mean field type control. In this case, the goal is to assign
a strategy to all agents at once, such that the resulting crowd behavior is optimal with respect to
costs imposed on a central planner. For a comparison of mean field games and mean field type
control, see the book of Bensoussan, Frehse, and Yam [8] as well as the article by Carmona, Delarue,
and Lachapelle [23]. A key reference is the work of Carmona and Delarue [22], which characterizes
solutions to the mean field type control problem in terms of a stochastic maximum principle for
McKean-Vlasov type dynamics.
While mean field type control is conceptually distinct from mean field games, and although in
general an optimal control on the one hand is not an equilibrium strategy on the other, nevertheless
The author is grateful to be supported in this work by the National Science Foundation under NSF Grant DMS-
1303775.
1
in many cases a mean field Nash equilibrium is also the solution to an optimal control problem, as
pointed out at least as early as [47]. Many researchers have used this insight to generate results
concerning existence and uniqueness [15, 17, 18, 53, 19] as well as computation of mean field Nash
equilibria [7]. It must be understood that the overall minimized cost is smaller than the total
cost to all individual players; the difference between the two is called the price of anarchy (see the
discussion in [7]). The present work also highlights this point of view. Our motivating example from
economics, while conceptually construed as a Nash equilibrium, can be solved via a reformulation
as an optimal control problem. For this reason our results are more heavily inclined toward the
study of mean field type control, even though, a priori, we are interested in mean field games.
One of the most natural ways to apply mean field game theory is to such fields as economics and
systemic risk, since here the critical questions concern the behavior of large numbers of individuals
motivated by similar incentives. See, for instance, the thesis of Gue´ant [32] on mean field games
and economics, as well as related work by Gue´ant et al. [48] and by Lachapelle, Salomon, and
Turinici [42]; the influential paper of Lucas and Moll [52]; the work of Carmona, Fouque and Sun
on systemic risk [25]; and many other references, many of which can be found in the survey articles
[1, 13, 28].
In this paper we are particularly motivated by a model of the production of an exhaustible resource,
such as oil. We draw our inspiration from a model found in [35] and later adapted by Chan and
Sircar in [26, 27]. (See also the work of Bauso, Tembine, and Basar [6].) A well-posedness result
for a related system of partial differential equations appears in a paper by Bensoussan and the
present author [31]. The basic structure of the model is as follows. Let X represent the amount of
remaining reserves held by a firm, v the level of production, and the dynamics governed by a linear
stochastic differential equation:
dX(s) = −v(s)ds + νX(s)dW (s) + ν0X(s)dW0(s), X(t) = x.
A (mean field) Nash equilibrium is obtained whenever each firm has solved the profit maximization
problem
sup
v
E
[∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)v(s)(2α − 2βψ¯(s)− v(s))ds − e−µ(T−t)|X(T )|2
]
where µ is the discount rate and ψ(s) = E[vˆ(s)|F 0s ] is the conditional expectation (given the
common noise) of the equilibrium strategy vˆ(s). The reason for the appearance of the conditional
expectation of the equilibrium strategy in the objective functional is that the market price is
determined by taking an average. In this model, we have simplified the calculation of the price
considerably by taking a linear demand schedule (cf. Chan and Sircar [26]). Hence the mean field
game is of linear-quadratic form.
Linear quadratic models were among the first to receive full mathematical treatment by researchers
studying mean field games. For the infinite time horizon case, we mention the work of Gue´ant
[33], of Caines, Huang, and Malhame´ [36, 37, 38, 39], and of Li and Zhang [50]. For the finite time
horizon case, we mention in particular the work of Bensoussan et al. [10], which deals both with
mean field games and mean field type control problems. See also [5, 34, 41, 42, 43, 58, 59]. For the
discrete time case, see the recent work of Ni, Zhang, and Li [54].
On the mean field type control side, the general linear quadratic case without common noise has
been dealt with in the work of Yong [60]. Unlike most other references, his result allows the cost
functional to depend on the expected value of the control as well as of the state variable. In that
work the motivation for this dependence comes from problems involving the minimization of the
variance, both of the control and state variables. In this paper, by contrast, we are interested
in economic applications, and in fact we will see that the mean field game described above can
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be written as a mean field type control problem, in that the equilibrium strategy is the optimal
decision for a central planner trying to minimize the following objective functional:
E
[∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)v(s)(v(s) + βE[v(s)|F 0s ]− 2α)ds + e
−µ(T−t)|X(T )|2
]
.
Three other recent works of particular importance in the context of mean field type control have
recently been published by Pham and Wei [56, 57] and by Pham [55]. Pham and Wei develop a
dynamic programming technique (see also [49]), with corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equations on
an infinite dimensional space of probability measures, for solving mean field type optimal control
problems, first without [56] and then with common noise [57]. Both of these citations include brief
applications to linear-quadratic problems. We note that [56] reproduces and slightly extends the
results of [60] using dynamic programming. Meanwhile [57] treats the case of a common noise;
however, in that case the control is already adapted to the common noise, which allows the authors
to prove that the distribution of the state variable is Markovian (a crucial step in proving the
dynamic programming principle). In [55] Pham further develops the theory of linear quadratic
problems with common noise by considering random coefficients; again in this reference the control
is adapted to the common noise. The present work is complementary to [56, 57, 55] in that (a) we
investigate the case where the control is not necessarily adapted to the common noise, and both the
control and its conditional expectation (given the common noise) are variables in the dynamics and
the cost; (b) we explicitly consider the connection with mean field games; and (c) we are inspired
by a particular application to economics, in contrast to the financial applications of these other
works. However, we only consider deterministic coefficients.
The distinguishing features of the present work are as follows. First, we will deal with the case of
a common noise, which is taken to represent an inherent uncertainty in nature affecting simultane-
ously all the agents participating in the game (or being controlled by a central planner). Second, as
in [60, 56] but unlike most of the previous references, we will consider the conditional expectation
of the control variable (or the equilibrium strategy in the case of mean field games) as a factor
in the dynamics and quadratic cost. Finally, we use an economic model from recent literature to
illustrate the applicability of our general framework.
Mean field games with common noise have been analyzed recently using several different approaches.
First we mention the master equation, first introduced by Lions in his lectures at the Colle`ge de
France [51] (see also [14, 21, 9]). This is a partial differential equation on the Wasserstein space of
probability measures, where the common noise is encoded in a second-order derivative with respect
to the measure variable. A well-posedness result for the master equation can be found in [16],
including in the case of a common noise. A different approach, from a probabilistic point of view,
can be found in the work of Ahuja [4] and Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [24]. The former starts
with the stochastic maximum principle for a representative player and uses a fixed point argument
to find a mean field Nash equilibrium. The latter also develops a theory of weak solutions for which
there is a quite general existence result.
A question of particular interest in the case of common noise is whether the mean field equilibrium
can act as an approximate solution of an N -player game for large N . Such an approximation is
known as “ǫ-Nash equilibrium” [14, 36, 37, 40]. The first largely comprehensive account of this
problem for mean field games with common noise was given by Lacker in [44]. Note, however, that
this general result does not cover all linear quadratic models. In the present work we will prove
that mean field game solutions serve as ǫ-Nash equilibria for large N -player games, but only in a
special case which most directly motivates our results, namely when the game is in fact solved by
an optimal control problem.
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To complete this introduction, we give an outline of the rest of the paper. In Section 2 we completely
solve the linear-quadratic mean field type control problem. We characterize the solution both
in terms of a stochastic maximum principle (forward-backward system of stochastic differential
equations) and Riccati equations. In Section 3 we discuss the question of Nash equilibrium. Rather
than seek the most general possible solution, our main goal will be to provide criteria that allow an
equilibrium to be interpreted as a global optimal solution for a mean field control problem, in which
case the results of Section 2 can be applied to show that there is a unique solution to the mean
field game. Finally, in Section 4, we describe and solve a linear-quadratic version of an economic
production model.
2. The Mean Field Type Control Problem
Fix an initial time t and a final time T . Let (Ω, (Fs)s∈[t,T ],P) be a complete filtered probability
space. We suppose that W (s),W0(s) are independent (Fs)s∈[t,T ]-Wiener processes, and that x is
a random variable independent of W (s),W0(s). (Here W0(s) is considered as the common noise.)
Throughout we will denote by (F 0s )s∈[t,T ] the filtration generated by W0(s), s ∈ [t, T ]. If X(s)
is any stochastic process adapted to (Fs)s∈[t,T ], we denote X¯(s) = E[X(s)|F
0
s ], the conditional
expectation of X(s) given W0(s).
The linear-quadratic mean field type control problem is formulated as follows. An admissible
control is defined to be a square integrable (Fs)s∈[t,T ]-adapted process with values in R
m. The
corresponding state variable X(s) is an Rd-valued adapted process satisfying the dynamics
(2.1) dX(s) =
{
A(s)X(s) + A¯(s)X¯(s) +B(s)v(s) + B¯(s)v¯(s)
}
ds
+
{
C(s)X(s) + C¯(s)X¯(s) +D(s)v(s) + D¯(s)v¯(s)
}
dW (s)
+
{
F (s)X(s) + F¯ (s)X¯(s) +G(s)v(s) + G¯(s)v¯(s)
}
dW0(s), X(t) = x.
Let 〈., .〉 be the inner product on Euclidean space. The objective functional is given by
(2.2)
JLQx,t (v) = E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)X(s),X(s)〉 + 〈Q¯(s)X¯(s), X¯(s)〉+ 〈R(s)v(s), v(s)〉 + 〈R¯(s)v¯(s), v¯(s)〉
+ 2〈S(s)X(s), v(s)〉 + 2〈S¯(s)X¯(s), v¯(s)〉+ 2〈q(s),X(s)〉 + 2〈q¯(s), X¯(s)〉
+ 2〈r(s), v(s)〉 + 2〈r¯(s), v¯(s)〉
]
ds+ 〈HX(T ),X(T )〉 + 〈H¯X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
}
.
We seek an optimal control vˆ such that
(2.3) JLQx,t (vˆ) = infv
JLQx,t (v).
Let us now give some standing assumptions on the coefficients. First, we define Sn to be the set of
all n× n symmetric matrices with real entries. Now we state the following:
Assumption 2.1. The coefficient matrices satisfy
(1) A, A¯, C, C¯, F, F¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd×d)
(2) B, B¯,D, D¯,G, G¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd×m)
(3) Q, Q¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sd), R, R¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm), H, H¯ ∈ Sd
(4) H,H + H¯ ≥ 0, and for some δ1 ≥ 0, δ2 > 0, Q,Q+ Q¯ ≥ δ1I and R,R+ R¯ ≥ δ2I
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(5) S, S¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rm×d); q, q¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd); r, r¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rm)
(6) ‖S‖2∞, ‖S + S¯‖
2
∞ < δ1δ2 if δ1 > 0, S = S¯ = 0 otherwise.
Under these assumptions, the dynamics (2.1) are well-posed in the following sense:
Lemma 2.2. Let v be an admissible control process and x an L2(Ω,Ft,P) random variable. Then
there exists a unique (Fs)t≤s≤T -adapted state process X(s) satisfying (2.1) with a continuous ver-
sion such that
E
∫ T
t
|X(s)|2ds <∞.
Proof. This is proved in a straightforward manner using a fixed point argument, following standard
theory for McKean-Vlasov dynamics. (See [60] for details.) 
Lemma 2.3. The functional JLQx,t is uniformly convex and has a unique minimizer.
Proof. Observe that
E[〈Q(s)X(s), X¯(s)〉] = E[E[〈Q(s)X(s), X¯(s)〉|F 0s ]] = E[〈E[Q(s)X(s)|F
0
s ], X¯(s)〉] = E[Q(s)X¯(s), X¯(s)〉],
so that
E[〈Q(s)X(s),X(s)〉 + 〈Q¯(s)X¯(s), X¯(s)]
= E[〈Q(s)(X(s)− X¯(s)),X(s) − X¯(s)〉+ 〈(Q(s) + Q¯(s))X¯(s), X¯(s)].
In like manner, we have
E[〈R(s)v(s), v(s)〉 + 〈R¯(s)v¯(s), v¯(s)]
= E[〈R(s)(v(s)− v¯(s)), v(s)− v¯(s)〉+ 〈(R(s) + R¯(s))v¯(s), v¯(s)].
and
E[〈S(s)X(s), v(s)〉 + 〈S¯(s)X¯(s), v¯(s)]
= E[〈S(s)(X(s) − X¯(s)), v(s) − v¯(s)〉+ 〈(S(s) + S¯(s))X¯(s), v¯(s)].
Strict convexity now follows from Assumption 2.1. The existence and uniqueness of the minimizer
follows from the weak lower semicontinuity of the functional.

2.1. Optimality conditions.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose v is an optimal control minimizing the functional JX,t(v), with cor-
responding trajectory X(s) (the solution of (2.1)). Then there exists a unique adapted solution
(Y,Z,Z0) of the BSDE
(2.4)

dY (s) = −
(
AT (s)Y (s) + A¯T (s)Y¯ (s) + CT (s)Z(s) + C¯T Z¯(s) + F T (s)Z0(s) + F¯
T (s)Z¯0(s)
+Q(s)X(s) + Q¯(s)X¯(s) + ST (s)v(s) + S¯T (s)v¯(s) + q(s) + q¯(s)
)
ds
+Z(s)dW (s) + Z0(s)dW0(s), s ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = HX(T ) + H¯X¯(T )
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satisfying the coupling condition
(2.5) BT (s)Y (s) + B¯T (s)Y¯ (s) +DT (s)Z(s) + D¯T (s)Z¯(s) +GT (s)Z0(s) + G¯
T (s)Z¯0(s)
+R(s)v(s) + R¯(s)v¯(s) + S(s)X(s) + S¯(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s) = 0, s ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
Here, as usual, Y¯ (s) := E[Y (s)|F 0s ], Z¯(s) := E[Z(s)|F
0
s ], and Z¯0(s) := E[Z0(s)|F
0
s ].
Conversely, suppose (X, v, Y, Z) is an adapted solution to the forward-backward system (2.1),(2.4).
Then v is the optimal control minimizing JX,t(v), and X(s) is the optimal trajectory.
Proof. The Gaˆteaux derivative of JLQx,t (v) is
(2.6)
d
dh
JLQx,t (v + hv˜)
∣∣∣∣
h=0
= 2E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)X(s), X˜(s)〉+ 〈Q¯(s)X¯(s), ¯˜X(s)〉 + 〈R(s)v(s), v˜(s)〉
+ 〈R¯(s)v¯(s), ¯˜v(s)〉 + 〈S(s)X(s), v˜(s)〉+ 〈S(s)X˜(s), v(s)〉+ 〈S¯(s)X¯(s), ¯˜v(s)〉+ 〈S¯(s) ¯˜X(s), v¯(s)〉
+ 〈q(s), X˜(s)〉+ 〈q¯(s), ¯˜X(s)〉+ 〈r(s), v˜(s)〉+ 〈r¯(s), ¯˜v(s)〉
]
ds+ 〈HX(T ), X˜(T )〉+ 〈H¯X¯(T ), ¯˜X(T )〉
}
where X˜ is the solution of (2.1) with v replaced by v˜ and X replaced by 0. If (X, v) is optimal,
then we get the optimality condition
(2.7) E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)X(s) + Q¯(s)X¯(s) + ST (s)v(s) + S¯T (s)v¯(s) + q(s) + q¯(s), X˜(s)〉
+ 〈R(s)v(s) + R¯(s)v¯(s) + S(s)X(s) + S¯(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s), v˜(s)〉
]
ds
+ 〈HX(T ) + H¯X¯(T ), X˜(T )〉
}
= 0
Now by [11, 12] we have a solution to the McKean-Vlasov type BSDE (2.4). By the Itoˆ formula,
(2.8) E〈Y (T ), X˜(T )〉
= E
∫ T
t
〈BT (s)Y (s) + B¯T (s)Y¯ (s) +DT (s)Y (s) + D¯T (s)Z¯(s) +GT (s)Z0(s) + G¯
T (s)Z¯0(s), v˜(s)〉ds
− E
∫ T
t
〈X˜(s), Q(s)X(s) + Q¯(s)X¯(s) + ST (s)v(s) + S¯T (s)v¯(s) + q(s) + q¯(s)〉ds,
which by using the optimality condition (2.7) and the fact that Y (T ) = HX(T )+ H¯X¯(T ) becomes
(2.9)
0 = E
∫ T
t
〈BT (s)Y (s)+B¯T (s)Y¯ (s)+DT (s)Y (s)+D¯T (s)Z¯(s)+GT (s)Z0(s)+G¯
T (s)Z¯0(s), v˜(s)〉ds
+ E
∫ T
t
〈R(s)v(s) + R¯(s)v¯(s) + S(s)X(s) + S¯(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s), v˜(s)〉ds.
Since v˜ is arbitrary, we obtain the coupling condition (2.5), as desired.
To prove the converse, it suffices to note that our assumptions imply that JLQx,t (·) is strictly convex.
Then, given a solution (X(s), v(s), Y (s), Z(s), Z0(s)) to the system (2.1),(2.4), we know from (2.6)
that the Gaˆteaux derivative of JLQx,t at v is zero, which implies v is the minimizer, as desired. 
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2.2. Riccati equations. In order to find explicit solutions of the mean field type control problem,
we derive a system of Riccati equations. We use a technique developed by Yong in [60]. We suppose
Y (s) = P (s)(X(s) − X¯(s)) + Π(s)X¯(s) + φ(s)
where P and Π are Sd-valued processes such that
P (T ) = H, Π(T ) = H + H¯.
and φ(s) is an Rd-valued process. Note that P,Π, and φ are deterministic. Our goal is to derive a
system of ordinary differential equations governing their evolution (backwards) in time.
By taking conditional expectation we have
Y¯ (s) = Π(s)X¯(s) + φ(s) and Y (s)− Y¯ (s) = P (s)(X(s)− X¯(s)).
Now
(2.10) dX¯ =
{
(A+ A¯)X¯ + (B + B¯)v¯
}
ds+
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
dW0,
which implies
(2.11) d(X − X¯) =
{
A(X − X¯) +B(v − v¯)
}
ds
+
{
C(X − X¯) + (C + C¯)X¯ +D(v − v¯) + (D + D¯)v¯
}
dW +
{
F (X − X¯) +G(v − v¯)
}
dW0.
Now recall that
(2.12) dY = −
(
ATY + A¯T Y¯ + CTZ + C¯T Z¯ + F TZ0 + F¯
T Z¯0 +QX + Q¯X¯
+ ST v + S¯T v¯ + q + q¯
)
ds+ ZdW + Z0dW0
= −
(
AT (Y − Y¯ ) + (AT + A¯T )Y¯ + CT (Z − Z¯) + (CT + C¯T )Z¯ + F T (Z0 − Z¯0) + (F
T + F¯ T )Z¯0
+Q(X − X¯) + (Q+ Q¯)X¯ + ST v + S¯T v¯ + q + q¯
)
ds+ ZdW + Z0dW0.
On the other hand,
(2.13) d(Y − Y¯ ) = P˙ (X − X¯)ds+ Pd(X − X¯)
=
{
P˙ (X − X¯) + PA(X − X¯) + PB(v − v¯)
}
ds
+ P
{
C(X − X¯) + (C + C¯)X¯ +D(v − v¯) + (D + D¯)v¯
}
dW + P
{
F (X − X¯) +G(v − v¯)
}
dW0
while
(2.14) dY¯ = (φ˙+ Π˙X¯)ds +ΠdX¯
=
{
φ˙+ Π˙X¯ +Π(A+ A¯)X¯ +Π(B + B¯)v¯
}
ds+Π
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
dW0.
Note that dY = d(Y − Y¯ ) + dY¯ . By comparing the diffusion terms, we get
(2.15) Z = P
{
C(X − X¯) + (C + C¯)X¯ +D(v − v¯) + (D + D¯)v¯
}
and
(2.16) Z0 = P
{
F (X − X¯) +G(v − v¯)
}
+Π
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
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which imply
(2.17) Z¯ = P
{
(C + C¯)X¯ + (D + D¯)v¯
}
,
(2.18) Z − Z¯ = P
{
C(X − X¯) +D(v − v¯)
}
,
(2.19) Z¯0 = Π
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
,
and
(2.20) Z0 − Z¯0 = P
{
F (X − X¯) +G(v − v¯)
}
.
Next we use the coupling condition (2.5) to find a formula for v(s). We have
(2.21)
0 = BT (Y − Y¯ ) + (BT + B¯T )Y¯ +DT (Z − Z¯) + (DT + D¯T )Z¯ +GT (Z0 − Z¯0) + (G
T + G¯T )Z¯0
+R(v − v¯) + (R+ R¯)v¯ + S(X − X¯) + (S + S¯)X¯ + r + r¯
= BTP (X − X¯) + (BT + B¯T )ΠX¯ + (BT + B¯T )φ+DTP
{
C(X − X¯) +D(v − v¯)
}
+ (DT + D¯T )P
{
(C + C¯)X¯ + (D + D¯)v¯
}
+GTP
{
F (X − X¯) +G(v − v¯)
}
+ (GT + G¯T )Π
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
+R(v − v¯) + (R+ R¯)v¯ + S(X − X¯) + (S + S¯)X¯ + r + r¯
= Λ0(X − X¯) + Λ1X¯ +Σ0(v − v¯) + Σ1v¯ + (B
T + B¯T )φ+ r + r¯
with
Λ0 = B
TP +DTPC +GTPF + S,
Λ1 = (B
T + B¯T )Π + (DT + D¯T )P (C + C¯) + (GT + G¯T )Π(F + F¯ ) + S + S¯,
Σ0 = D
TPD +R,
Σ1 = (D
T + D¯T )P (D + D¯) + (GT + G¯T )Π(G + G¯) + (R+ R¯).
Taking conditional expectation, we deduce
(2.22) Σ1(s)v¯(s) + Λ1(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s) + (B
T (s) + B¯T (s))φ(s) = 0
so that, assuming Σ1(s) is invertible,
(2.23) v¯(s) = −Σ1(s)
−1(Λ1(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s) + (B
T (s) + B¯T (s))φ(s)).
Assuming Σ0(s) is also invertible, we therefore have
(2.24) v(s) = v(s)− v¯(s) + v¯(s)
= −Σ0(s)
−1(Λ0(s)(X(s)−X¯(s))+Λ1(s)X¯(s)+Σ1(s)v¯(s)+r(s)+ r¯(s)+(B
T (s)+B¯T (s))φ(s))+v¯(s)
= −Σ0(s)
−1Λ0(s)(X(s)− X¯(s))− Σ1(s)
−1(Λ1(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s) + (B
T (s) + B¯T (s))φ(s)).
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Now we compare the drift terms from (2.12) to those of (2.13) and (2.14). Using the relations
(2.17),(2.18),(2.19),(2.20),(2.23), and (2.24) proved above, we get
(2.25)
0 =
(
P˙ +ATP + PA+ CTPC + F TPF +Q− (PB + CTPD + F TPG+ ST )Σ−10 Λ0
)
(X − X¯)
+
(
Π˙ + (AT + A¯T )Π + Π(A+ A¯) + (CT + C¯T )P (C + C¯) + (F T + F¯ T )Π(F + F¯ ) +Q+ Q¯
− (Π(B + B¯) + (CT + C¯T )P (D + D¯) + (F T + F¯ T )Π(G+ G¯) + ST + S¯T )Σ−11 Λ1
)
X¯
+ φ˙− (Π(B + B¯) + (CT + C¯T )P (D + D¯) + (F T + F¯ T )Π(G+ G¯) + ST + S¯T )Σ−11 (r + r¯) + q + q¯.
We deduce that P and Π should satisfy the following Riccati equations:
(2.26)


P˙ +ATP + PA+ CTPC + F TPF +Q
−(PB + CTPD + F TPG+ ST )(DTPD +R)−1(BTP +DTPC +GTPF + S) = 0,
P (T ) = H
and
(2.27)

Π˙ + (AT + A¯T )Π + Π(A+ A¯) + (CT + C¯T )P (C + C¯) + (F T + F¯ T )Π(F + F¯ ) + (Q+ Q¯)
−
(
Π(B + B¯) + (CT + C¯T )P (D + D¯) + (F T + F¯ T )Π(G+ G¯) + ST + S¯T
)
Σ−11
·
(
(B + B¯)TΠ+ (D + D¯)TP (C + C¯) + (G+ G¯)TΠ(F + F¯ ) + S + S¯
)
= 0,
Σ1 = (D
T + D¯T )P (D + D¯) + (GT + G¯T )Π(G+ G¯) + (R + R¯),
Π(T ) = H + H¯.
Once we have P,Π solutions to (2.26),(2.27), respectively, we set
φ(s) =
∫ s
t
{
(Π(B+B¯)+(CT+C¯T )P (D+D¯)+(F T+F¯ T )Π(G+G¯)+ST+S¯T )Σ−11 (r+ r¯)+q+ q¯
}
dτ.
A standard reference on optimal control, e.g. [61], suffices to show that under the given assumptions
(2.26) has a unique solution, which in addition is symmetric. To see that (2.27) has a unique
solution, we note that (CT + C¯T )P (C + C¯) is also a symmetric matrix, and therefore by the same
reference we can deduce there exists a unique solution of (2.27), which is also symmetric.
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We can deduce the dynamics of the optimal trajectory using (2.24).
(2.28) dX =
{
A(X − X¯) + (A+ A¯)X¯ +B(v − v¯) + (B + B¯)v¯
}
ds
+
{
C(X − X¯) + (C + C¯)X¯ +D(v − v¯) + (D + D¯)v¯
}
dW
+
{
F (X − X¯) + (F + F¯ )X¯ +G(v − v¯) + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
dW0
=
{
(A−BΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (A+ A¯− (B + B¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (B + B¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
ds
+
{
(C −DΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (C + C¯ − (D + D¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (D + D¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
dW
+
{
(F −GΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (F + F¯ − (G+ G¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (G+ G¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
dW0.
A formula for the process Z can also be deduced from (2.18), (2.17), and (2.24):
(2.29) Z = Z − Z¯ + Z¯ = P
{
C −DΣ−10 Λ0
}
(X − X¯)
+ P
{
(C + C¯)− (D + D¯)Σ−11 Λ1
}
X¯ − P (D + D¯)Σ−11 (r + r¯),
and for Z0 we get the following by using (2.20) and (2.19):
(2.30) Z0 = Z − Z¯ + Z¯0 = P
{
F −GΣ−10 Λ0
}
(X − X¯)
+ Π
{
(F + F¯ )− (G+ G¯)Σ−11 Λ1
}
X¯ −Π(G+ G¯)Σ−11 (r + r¯).
We summarize our results here:
Theorem 2.5. There exists a unique solution P,Π to the pair of Riccati equations (2.26) and
(2.27), where P,Π are both Sd-valued deterministic processes. Moreover, the unique optimal trajec-
tory for Problem (2.3) is given by the solution to the SDE
(2.31) dX =
{
(A−BΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (A+ A¯− (B + B¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (B + B¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
ds
+
{
(C −DΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (C + C¯ − (D + D¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (D + D¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
dW
+
{
(F −GΣ−10 Λ0)(X − X¯) + (F + F¯ − (G+ G¯)Σ
−1
1 Λ1)X¯ − (G+ G¯)Σ
−1
1 (r + r¯)
}
dW0.
with
Λ0 = B
TP +DTPC +GTPF + S,
Λ1 = (B
T + B¯T )Π + (DT + D¯T )P (C + C¯) + (GT + G¯T )Π(F + F¯ ) + S + S¯,
Σ0 = D
TPD +R,
Σ1 = (D
T + D¯T )P (D + D¯) + (GT + G¯T )Π(G + G¯) + (R+ R¯).
The SDE (2.31) has a unique solution. The optimal control is given by
(2.32)
v(s) = −Σ0(s)
−1Λ0(s)(X(s)− X¯(s))− Σ1(s)
−1(Λ1(s)X¯(s) + r(s) + r¯(s) + (B
T (s) + B¯T (s))φ(s)).
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If we define the adjoint processes
Y (s) = P (s)(X(s) − X¯(s)) + Π(s)X¯(s) + φ(s),
Z(s) = P
{
C −DΣ−10 Λ0
}
(X − X¯) + P
{
(C + C¯)− (D + D¯)Σ−11 Λ1
}
X¯ − P (D + D¯)Σ−11 (r + r¯),
Z0(s) = P
{
F −GΣ−10 Λ0
}
(X − X¯) + Π
{
(F + F¯ )− (G+ G¯)Σ−11 Λ1
}
X¯ −Π(G+ G¯)Σ−11 (r + r¯)
where
φ(s) =
∫ s
t
{
(Π(B+B¯)+(CT+C¯T )P (D+D¯)+(F T+F¯ T )Π(G+G¯)+ST+S¯T )Σ−11 (r+ r¯)+q+ q¯
}
dτ,
then the quintuple (X, v, Y, Z,Z0) is an adapted solution to the mean field FBSDE (2.1),(2.4).
3. The Mean Field Game
In this section, we consider the problem of Nash equilibrium rather than optimal control. We
modify the dynamics (2.1) as follows. Let ξ¯(s) and ψ¯(s) be given processes adapted to the filtration
{F 0s }s≥t. Consider
(3.1) dX(s) =
{
A(s)X(s) + A¯(s)ξ¯(s) +B(s)v(s) + B¯(s)ψ¯(s)
}
ds
+
{
C(s)X(s) + C¯(s)ξ¯(s) +D(s)v(s) + D¯(s)ψ¯(s)
}
dW (s)
+
{
F (s)X(s) + F¯ (s)ξ¯(s) +G(s)v(s) + G¯(s)ψ¯(s)
}
dW0(s), X(t) = x
and the objective functional
(3.2)
Jmfgx,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯) = E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)X(s),X(s)〉+2〈Q¯(s)ξ¯(s),X(s)〉+〈R(s)v(s), v(s)〉+2〈R¯(s)ψ¯(s), v(s)〉
+ 2〈S(s)X(s), v(s)〉 + 2〈S¯1(s)ξ¯(s), v(s)〉 + 2〈S¯2(s)X(s), ψ¯(s)〉
+2〈q(s),X(s)〉+2〈q¯(s), ξ¯(s)〉+2〈r(s), v(s)〉+2〈r¯(s), ψ¯(s)〉
]
ds+〈HX(T ),X(T )〉+2〈H¯ ξ¯(T ),X(T )〉
}
.
The goal is to find a process vˆ(s) such that, given the process Xˆ(s) generated by vˆ, we have
(3.3) JNEX,t (vˆ; ξ¯, ψ¯) = infv
JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯) and E[Xˆ(s)|F
0
s ] = ξ¯, E[vˆ(s)|F
0
s ] = ψ¯.
Such a process vˆ is called a mean field Nash equilibrium. Note that, rather than an optimizer, we
are seeking a fixed point of the map
v 7→ (X, v) 7→ (ξ¯, ψ¯) 7→ vˆ,
where any given control v generates a state process X, (X, v) generate processes (ξ¯, ψ¯) by taking
conditional expectation with respect to the common noise, and vˆ is an optimal control with respect
to these given processes.
We make similar assumptions as before:
Assumption 3.1. The following are the assumption on the coefficient matrices for the mean field
game:
(1) A, A¯, C, C¯, F, F¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd×d)
(2) B, B¯,D, D¯,G, G¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd×m)
(3) Q, Q¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sd), R, R¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm), H, H¯ ∈ Sd
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(4) H ≥ 0, and for some δ1 ≥ 0, δ2 > 0, Q ≥ δ1I and R ≥ δ2I
(5) S, S¯1, S¯2 ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Rm×d); q, q¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rd); r, r¯ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rm)
(6) ‖S‖2∞ < δ1δ2 if δ1 6= 0, S = 0 otherwise.
Our goal is not to find the most general conditions under which we may solve this fixed point
problem (cf. [4, 24]). Indeed, the fact that the conditional expectation of the control variable
appears in the objective functional (in equilibrium) seems to complicate matters considerably. In
the first part of this section, we will give a brief discussion of where the difficulty lies. In the
following subsections, we will focus more on the case which is of most interest to us, namely when
the Nash equilibrium can be computed by finding an optimizer to a mean field type control problem.
Let us first see that, for given processes (ξ¯, ψ¯), there is indeed an optimal control vˆ. Using the same
arguments as in the previous section, we obtain the following characterization.
Proposition 3.2. For a given pair (ξ¯, π¯), there exists a unique optimal control v minimizing the
functional JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯). Furthermore, let X(s) be the corresponding trajectory (the solution of (3.1)
with control v(s)). Then there exists a unique adapted solution (Y,Z,Z0) of the BSDE
(3.4)


dY (s) = −
(
AT (s)Y (s) + CT (s)Z(s) + F T (s)Z0(s)+
+Q(s)X(s) + Q¯(s)ξ¯(s) + ST (s)v(s) + S¯T2 (s)ψ¯(s) + q(s)
)
ds
+Z(s)dW (s) + Z0(s)dW0(s), s ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = HX(T ) + H¯ξ¯(T )
satisfying the coupling condition
(3.5) BT (s)Y (s) +DT (s)Z(s) +GT (s)Z0(s)
+R(s)v(s) + R¯(s)ψ¯(s) + S(s)X(s) + S¯1(s)ξ¯(s) + r(s) = 0, s ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
Conversely, suppose (X, v, Y, Z) is an adapted solution to the forward-backward system (3.1),(3.4)
and coupling condition (3.5). Then v is the optimal control minimizing JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯), and X(s) is
the optimal trajectory. If, in addition, we have E[X(s)|F 0s ] = ξ¯(s) and E[v(s)|F
0
s ] = ψ¯(s) then
v(s) is a mean field Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 can be seen as an abstract condition for the solvability of the fixed point problem.
However, one would like to have a more concrete criterion giving existence of a mean field Nash
equilibrium. Let us attempt to follow the discussion in [10] and find out where the difficulty lies.
Suppose there exists a mean field Nash equilibrium v(s). Then X¯(s) = E[X(s)|F 0s ] satisfies the
dynamics
(3.6) dX¯ =
{
(A+ A¯)X¯ + (B + B¯)v¯
}
ds +
{
(F + F¯ )X¯ + (G+ G¯)v¯
}
dW0, X¯(t) = X¯
while Y¯ satisfies
(3.7) dY¯ = −
(
AT Y¯ +CT Z¯+F T Z¯0+(Q+Q¯)X¯+(S
T+S¯T2 )v¯+q
)
ds+Z¯0dW0, Y¯ (T ) = (H+H¯)ξ¯(T )
and we have the coupling condition
(3.8) BT Y¯ +DT Z¯ +GT Z¯0 + (R+ R¯)v¯ + (S + S¯1)X¯ + r = 0.
Conversely, suppose that the system (3.6),(3.7),(3.8) has a solution which we denote (ξ¯, η¯, ψ¯)
(corresponding to (X¯, Y¯ , v¯)). Then we let v be the optimal control minimizing JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯),
and let X(s) be the state solving the dynamics (3.1) and Y (s) the adjoint state solving (3.4).
Note that, by Proposition 3.2, the coupling condition (3.5) is satisfied. Now, if we knew that
v¯(s) := E[v(s)|F 0s ] = ψ¯(s), then we would see that (X¯, Y¯ , v¯) is also a solution to the system
(3.6),(3.7),(3.8), and it would not be difficult to see that therefore X¯ = ξ¯ and Y¯ = η¯ as well. Thus
we would have that v is a Nash equilibrium. However, this is a nontrivial criterion on v, since
there is nothing which obviously connects the control problem of minimizing (3.2) with the system
(3.6),(3.7),(3.8). So this fails to be an appropriate criteria for determining the existence of Nash
equilibrium.
On the other hand, if we take v¯ out of the problem, i.e. if we set B¯ = D¯ = G¯ = R¯ = S¯2 = 0, then
we obtain, as in [10], a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium.
This is summarized in the following proposition, whose proof is essentially the same as that of [10,
Theorem III.4].
Proposition 3.3. Let B¯ = D¯ = G¯ = R¯ = S¯2 = 0. Then there exists a mean-field Nash equilibrium
for the objective functional JNEX,t , given in (3.2), if and only if there exists a solution to the forward-
backward system of stochastic differential equations given by (3.6),(3.7), and (3.8).
There is another condition on the coefficients, given in Section 3.1 below, which permits us to assert
that there always exists a unique mean field Nash equilibrium, namely when the mean field game
corresponds to an optimal control problem. While this is not the most general case, it is directly
applicable to the economics example which motivated this work. Moreover, as we will see, we need
not give up all dependence on the conditional expectation of the control variable.
3.1. When is a Mean Field Game equivalent to a Mean Field Type Control Problem?
It is now well-known that, as pointed out in [47], mean field Nash equilibria can be characterized–at
least formally–as optimality conditions for mean field type control problems. Often this is exploited
to obtain results on existence and uniqueness of solutions to mean field games. See, for instance,
[15, 30, 17, 18, 7]. Here we point out a condition under which the Mean Field Type Control Problem
and the Mean Field Game are equivalent for the general linear-quadratic case.
Proposition 3.4. Let A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯, F¯ , G¯, q¯, and r¯ all be zero. Additionally, assume S¯ = S¯1 = S¯2.
Suppose vˆ(s) is the optimal control for the linear-quadratic functional JLQX,t (v) defined by (2.2), with
corresponding optimal trajectory Xˆ(s) defined by (2.1). Define ξ¯(s) := E[Xˆ(s)|F 0s ] and ψ¯(s) :=
E[vˆ(s)|F 0s ]. Then vˆ(s) is a mean field Nash equilibrium for J
NE
X,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯) defined by (3.2).
Conversely, if vˆ(s) is a mean field Nash equilibrium for JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯), then it is also an optimal
control for JLQX,t (v).
Proof. It suffices to note that, under the given assumptions, the (forward-backward) systems of
stochastic differential equations and their coupling conditions given by Propositions 2.4 and 3.2
are equivalent, once we have taken into account the equilibrium condition ξ¯(s) = E[Xˆ(s)|F 0s ] and
ψ¯(s) = E[vˆ(s)|F 0s ]. 
We note the following simple corollary of Proposition 3.4.
Corollary 3.5. Let A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯, F¯ , G¯, q¯, and r¯ all be zero. Additionally, assume S¯ = S¯1 = S¯2.
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Let ξ¯, ψ¯ be given F0s -adapted processes with values in R
d,Rm respectively. Then the linear-quadratic
functional JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯) defined by (3.2) has a mean field Nash equilibrium if and only if ξ¯(s) =
E[Xˆ(s)|F 0s ] and ψ¯(s) = E[vˆ(s)|F
0
s ], where v¯ is the optimal control of J
LQ
X,t (v) with corresponding
optimal trajectory Xˆ(s) defined by (2.1). Moreover, this equilibrium is unique.
Note that the objective functionals JLQX,t and J
NE
X,t given in (2.2) and (3.2), respectively, are not
precisely the same under the assumptions of Proposition 3.4. In other words, even though vˆ solves
both a fixed point Nash equilibrium and an mean field type control problem, the costs are different.
Indeed, suppose the assumptions of Proposition 3.4 hold, and take vˆ to be a mean field Nash
equilibrium with corresponding trajectory Xˆ. Define ξ¯(s) := E[Xˆ(s)|F 0s ] and ψ¯(s) := E[vˆ(s)|F
0
s ].
By the proposition, vˆ is the minimizer of both JNEX,t (v; ξ¯, ψ¯) and J
LQ
x,t (v). Now observe that
(3.9) JNEX,t (vˆ; ξ¯, ψ¯)− J
LQ
x,t (vˆ)
= E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q¯(s)X¯(s), X¯(s)〉+ 〈R¯(s)v¯(s), v¯(s)〉+ 〈S¯(s)X¯(s), v¯(s)〉
]
ds + 〈H¯X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
}
.
We call this difference the “price of anarchy,” since it is the added aggregate cost of allowing all
players to independently choose their optimal strategy.
3.2. ǫ-Nash equilibrium of an N-player game. In this section we discuss the relationship
between the mean field game given in the previous section and the analogous N -player game,
which can be formulated as follows. First, we specify that W1, . . . ,WN are N independent Wiener
processes, and X1, . . . ,XN are N i.i.d. random variables. The state of player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is
given by the dynamics
(3.10) dXi(s) =

A(s)Xi(s) + A¯(s) 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj(s) +B(s)vi(s) + B¯(s)
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
vj(s)

 ds
+

C(s)Xi(s) + C¯(s) 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj(s) +D(s)vi(s) + D¯(s)
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
vj(s)

 dWi(s)
+

F (s)Xi(s) + F¯ (s) 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj(s) +G(s)vi(s) + G¯(s)
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
vj(s)

 dW0(s), Xi(t) = Xi
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where vi is the control chosen by player i. The cost functional for player i is given by
(3.11) JN,iXi,t(v1, . . . , vN ) = J
N,i
Xi,t
(vi; {vj}j 6=i)
= E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)Xi(s),Xi(s)〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈Q¯(s)Xj(s),Xi(s)〉
+ 〈R(s)vi(s), vi(s)〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈R¯(s)vj(s), vi(s)〉+ 2〈S(s)Xi(s), vi(s)〉
+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈S¯1(s)Xj(s), vi(s)〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈S¯2(s)Xi(s), vj(s)〉
+ 2〈q(s),Xi(s)〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈q¯(s),Xj(s)〉+ 2〈r(s), vi(s)〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈r¯(s), vj(s)〉
]
ds
+ 〈HXi(T ),Xi(T )〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈H¯Xj(T ),Xi(T )〉
}
.
We seek to prove that the mean field equilibrium vˆ can be used as an approximate Nash equilibrium
for the N -player game, in a way that is stated precisely below.
Definition 3.6. We say that {vˆi}
N
i=1 is an “ǫ-Nash equilibrium” for the N -player game provided
that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3.12) JN,iXi,t(vi; {vˆj}j 6=i) ≥ J
N,i
Xi,t
(vˆi; {vˆj}j 6=i)− ǫ
for any set of controls {vi}
N
i=1.
See, for instance, [14, 36, 37, 40]. The following theorem states that the mean field Nash equilibrium
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game. However, we are unable to prove it here in the
general case. Instead, we restrict our attention to the case where the mean field game is equivalent
to an optimal control problem, as in Proposition 3.4.
Theorem 3.7. Let A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯, F¯ , G¯, q¯, and r¯ all be zero. Additionally, assume S¯ = S¯1 = S¯2.
Let v∗i be a mean field Nash equilibrium for (3.2) with X = Xi and W = Wi. Then for any ǫ > 0
there exists Nǫ large enough such that if N ≥ Nǫ, then {v
∗
i }
N
i=1 is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the
N -player game.
Proof. To begin with, we write down the dynamics which, given the hypotheses of the theorem, are
much simpler than (3.10):
(3.13) dXi = (AXi +Bvi)ds + (CXi +Dvi)dWi + (FXi +Gvi)dW0, Xi(t) = xi
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as well as the slightly simplified cost functionals:
(3.14) JN,iXi,t(v1, . . . , vN ) = J
N,i
Xi,t
(vi; {vj}j 6=i)
= E
{∫ T
t
[
〈QXi,Xi〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈Q¯Xj ,Xi〉+ 〈Rvi, vi〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈R¯vj, vi〉+ 2〈SXi, vi〉
+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈S¯Xj, vi〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈S¯Xi, vj〉+ 2〈q,Xi〉+ 2〈r, vi〉
]
ds
+ 〈HXi(T ),Xi(T )〉+ 2
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
〈H¯Xj(T ),Xi(T )〉
}
.
Now let us establish some notation. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We will let vi be an arbitrary given control.
Recall that v∗j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N} is the mean field Nash equilibrium for (3.2) with initial condition
Xj .
• Let X∗j (s), j ∈ {1, . . . , N} be the corresponding state as given by the mean field dynamics
(3.1) with initial condition Xj and W = Wj . Note that under our assumptions, X
∗
j (s) is
also the solution to the N -player game dynamics given by (3.10) with vj = v
∗
j .
• Let Xi(s) refer to the solution of the system given by (3.10) with an arbitrary given control
vi.
Now, as a first step towards the necessary estimates to prove the theorem, we compare the difference
between the mean field cost and that of the N -player game.
(3.15) Jmfgxi,t (v
∗
i ; X¯
∗
i , v¯
∗
i )− J
N,i
xi,t
(v∗i ; {v
∗
j }j 6=i)
= 2E


∫ T
t


〈
Q¯

X¯∗i − 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
X∗j

 ,X∗i
〉
+
〈
R¯

v¯∗i − 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
v∗j

 , v∗i
〉
+
〈
S¯

X¯∗i − 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
X∗j

 , v∗i
〉
+
〈
S¯X∗i , v¯
∗
i −
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
v∗j
〉 ds
+
〈
H¯

X¯∗i (T )− 1N − 1
∑
j 6=i
X∗j (T )

 ,X∗i (T )
〉

Observe that the processes X∗i are conditionally i.i.d. Since, in addition, they are continuous in
L2(Ω), we have, as N →∞,
(3.16) X¯∗i (s)−
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
X∗j (s)→ 0 in L
2(Ω), uniformly in s ∈ [t, T ].
Next, we recall that, by Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 2.5, we have a formula for v∗i in terms of
X∗i , namely (2.32) where P and Π are the solutions to the Riccati equations 2.26,(2.27). Based on
these formulas, we can similarly assert that
(3.17) v¯∗i −
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
v∗j → 0 in L
2.
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Combining these with the a priori bounds on X∗i and v
∗
i in L
2 as well as the L∞ bounds on the
coefficients, we see that, as N →∞,
Jmfgxi,t (v
∗
i ; X¯
∗
i , v¯
∗
i )− J
N,i
xi,t
(v∗i ; {v
∗
j }j 6=i) = o(1).
By analogous reasoning, we see that
Jmfgxi,t (vi; X¯
∗
i , v¯
∗
i )− J
N,i
xi,t
(vi; {v
∗
j }j 6=i) = o(1)
as well. Now by definition of mean field Nash equilibrium, v∗i is the optimal control for J
mfg
xi,t
(·; X¯∗i , v¯
∗
i ).
Therefore, we have
JN,ixi,t(vi; {v
∗
j }j 6=i) = J
mfg
xi,t
(vi; X¯
∗
i , v¯
∗
i ) + o(1)
≥ Jmfgxi,t (v
∗
i ; X¯
∗
i , v¯
∗
i ) + o(1)
= JN,ixi,t(v
∗
i ; {v
∗
j }j 6=i) + o(1),
which is what we wanted to show. 
4. Example from economics: production of an exhaustible resource
In this section we develop and analyze a model of exhaustible resource production, following the
work of Gue´ant, Lasry, and Lions in [35] and of Chan and Sircar in [26, 27]. As in the general
mean field setting, we assume the number of producers of a given resource (oil, for example) is
very large. Consider an arbitrary producer. Let v(s) represent the quantity produced at time s,
while X(s) is the producer’s current level of reserves. Following [35], we assume the dynamics are
stochastic, with the noise proportional to the current number of reserves. In addition, we deal with
a common noise, modeling uncertainty inherent in nature itself, rather than in the measurements
of individual producers. We have
(4.1) dX(s) = −v(s)ds + νX(s)dW (s) + ν0X(s)dW0(s), X(t) = x.
The goal of each individual producer is the maximization of profit. We model the market com-
petition as a Nash equilibrium. Define k(s) to be the price at which a producer can sell, and
define k¯(s) to be the market price. To simplify the analysis and allow the model to fall under our
linear-quadratic framework, we follow [26] and consider a linear demand schedule
(4.2) v(s) = γ + δk¯(s)− k(s)
for given parameters γ, δ. In [26] they are given by
(4.3) γ =
1
1 + ǫ
, δ =
ǫ
1 + ǫ
for a parameter ǫ ≥ 0 which measures the degree of competition (ǫ = 0 corresponds to monopoly,
as the market price is unseen by consumers, whereas ǫ = +∞ corresponds to perfect competition,
as the market price has exactly the same weight as the price offered by each individual firm). The
revenue maximization problem can now be stated as
(4.4) sup
v
E
[∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)v(s)k(s)ds − e−µ(T−t)|X(T )|2
]
.
To make this into a linear-quadratic functional of the form (3.2), we must first compute k(s) in
terms of v(s) and ψ¯(s), where we recall that ψ¯(s) = E[vˆ(s)|F 0s ] is the conditional expectation of
the optimal control. To do this, it will first be necessary to find a formula for the market price.
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Let kˆ(s) be the price corresponding to the optimal quantity vˆ(s). In equilibrium, the market price
is precisely the (conditional) expected value of kˆ(s), so that
k¯(s) = E[kˆ(s)|F 0s ] = E[γ + δk¯(s)− vˆ(s)|F
0
s ] = γ + δk¯(s)− ψ¯(s) ⇒ k¯(s) =
γ
1− δ
−
1
1− δ
ψ¯(s).
Hence from (4.2) we get
k(s) =
γ
1− δ
−
δ
1− δ
ψ¯(s)− v(s).
Then (4.4) becomes
(4.5) − inf
v
E
[∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)(v2(s) + 2βv(s)ψ¯(s)− 2αv(s))ds + e−µ(T−t)|X(T )|2
]
where we have set
(4.6) α :=
γ
2(1− δ)
, β :=
δ
2(1− δ)
.
The dynamics and objective functional above are a much simplified form of (3.1), with
A = A¯ = B¯ = C¯ = D = D¯ = F¯ = G = G¯ = 0, B = −1, C = ν, F = ν0.
Likewise in the cost functional (3.2) we have
Q = Q¯ = H¯ = S = S¯ = q = q¯ = r¯ = 0,
R(s) = e−µ(s−t), R¯(s) = βe−µ(s−t), r(s) = −αe−µ(s−t),H = e−µ(T−t).
Moreover, this setup satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 3.4, so the Nash equilibrium vˆ quantity
is in fact an optimizer for a mean field type control problem. The corresponding objective functional
is
(4.7)
JLQx,t (v(·)) = E
{∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)
(
v2(s) + β
(
E[v(s)|F 0s ]
)2
− 2αv(s)
)
ds+ e−µ(T−t)E[|X(T )|2]
}
,
and the price of anarchy is given by
Jmfgx,t (vˆ(·))− J
LQ
X,t (vˆ(·)) = βE
∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)
(
E[v(s)|F 0s ]
)2
ds.
If we take, as in [26], the formula δ = ǫ/(1 + ǫ), we get simply α = 1/2 and β = ǫ/2; so we see that
the price of anarchy is directly proportional to the competition coefficient ǫ:
JmfgX,t (vˆ(·)) − J
LQ
X,t (vˆ(·)) =
ǫ
2
E
∫ T
t
e−µ(s−t)
(
E[v(s)|F 0s ]
)2
ds.
4.1. Computation of the equilibrium strategy. By the theory developed in the previous sec-
tion, we can compute the market equilibrium quite explicitly. The Riccati equations are
(4.8)
{
p˙+ (ν2 + ν20)p − e
µ(s−t)p2 = 0,
p(T ) = e−µ(T−t)
and
(4.9)
{
π˙ + ν2p+ ν20π − (1 + β)
−1eµ(s−t)π2 = 0,
π(T ) = e−µ(T−t).
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We can explicitly solve for p. If λ := µ− (ν2 + ν20) 6= 0, we get
(4.10) p(s) =
λe−µ(s−t)
(λ+ 1)eλ(T−s) − 1
while if λ = 0 we find
(4.11) p(s) =
e−µ(s−t)
1 + T − s
.
Let us also remark that in the special case ν = 0 we can even compute π explicitly:
(4.12) π(s) =
(1 + β)λe−µ(s−t)
((1 + β)λ+ 1)eλ(T−s) − 1
if λ 6= 0,
(1 + β)e−µ(s−t)
1 + β + T − s
if λ = 0.
For the optimal trajectory, we have, by Equation (2.28),
(4.13) dX¯(s) =
(
−
1
1 + β
eµ(s−t)π(s)X¯(s)−
α
1 + β
)
ds+ ν0X¯(s)dW0(s)
and
(4.14) d(X(s) − X¯(s)) = −eµ(s−t)p(s)(X − X¯(s))ds + νX(s)dW (s) + ν0(X − X¯(s))dW0(s).
These can be solved explicitly in terms of π and p. We have
(4.15) X¯(s) = eΨ(s)
(
E[x|F 0t ]−
α
1 + β
∫ s
t
e−Ψ(τ)dτ
)
where
(4.16) Ψ(s) :=
1
1 + β
∫ s
t
eµ(τ−t)π(τ)dτ +
ν20
2
(s− t) + ν0(W0(s)−W0(t)),
which we then use to find that
(4.17) X(s)− X¯(s) = eΦ(s)
(
x− E[x|F 0t ]− ν
2
∫ s
t
e−Φ(τ)X¯(τ)dτ + ν
∫ s
t
e−Φ(τ)X¯(τ)dW (τ)
)
where
(4.18) Φ(s) :=
∫ s
t
eµ(τ−t)p(τ)dτ +
1
2
(ν2 + ν20)(s − t) + ν(W (s)−W (t)) + ν0(W0(s)−W0(t)).
Then we have the following for the optimal control, by Equation (2.24):
(4.19) v(s) = eµ(s−t)
(
p(s)(X(s)− X¯(s)) +
1
1 + β
π(s)X¯(s) +
α
(1 + β)2
∫ s
t
π(τ)dτ
)
+
α
1 + β
.
4.2. Market price. From Equation (4.19) and formula (4.2), we see that the market price is given
by
(4.20) k¯(s) = 2α− (1 + 2β)v¯(s) =
α
1 + β
− eµ(s−t)
(
1 + 2β
1 + β
π(s)X¯(s) +
α(1 + 2β)
(1 + β)2
∫ s
t
π(τ)dτ
)
which, when using the model of Chan and Sircar [26] so that α = 1/2 and β = ǫ/2, becomes
(4.21) k¯(s) =
1
2 + ǫ
−
2 + 2ǫ
2 + ǫ
eµ(s−t)
(
π(s)X¯(s) +
∫ s
t
π(τ)dτ
)
.
An interesting question is the behavior of the market price as the competition parameter ǫ increases.
Let us focus on the expected market price:
(4.22) E[k¯(s)] =
1
2 + ǫ
−
2 + 2ǫ
2 + ǫ
eµ(s−t)
(
π(s)χ(s) +
∫ s
t
π(τ)dτ
)
.
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where we define χ(s) = E[X(s)] = E[X¯(s)]. It is possible to give conditions on the initial data such
that the expected value of the state variable remains positive up to time T . To see this, note that
χ′(s) = −
1
1 + β
eµ(s−t)π(s)χ(s)−
α
1 + β
, χ(t) = E[x].
We solve to get
χ(s) =
(
E[x]−
α
1 + β
∫ s
t
exp
{
1
1 + β
∫ σ
t
π˜(τ)dτ
}
dσ
)
exp
{
−
1
1 + β
∫ s
t
π˜(τ)dτ
}
where π˜(s) = eµ(s−t)π(s). By analyzing π˜, we can find conditions under which χ(s) will be positive.
Note that
π˜′ + ν2p˜+ (ν20 − µ)π˜ −
1
1 + β
π˜2 = 0, π˜(T ) = 1
where p˜(s) = eµ(s−t)p(s). We use the inequality ab ≤ 14a
2 + b2 and the fact that p˜ ≤ 1 to get
−π˜′ ≤ ν2 +
1
4
(1 + β)(ν20 − µ)
2
which yields
π˜(s) ≤ 1 +
1
4
(
(1 + β)(ν20 − µ)
2 + 4ν2
)
(T − s) ≤ κ := 1 +
1
4
(
(1 + β)(ν20 − µ)
2 + 4ν2
)
T.
Using this estimate we deduce
χ(s) ≥
(
E[x]−
α
κ
(
eκ(s−t)/(1+β) − 1
))
exp
{
−
1
1 + β
∫ s
t
π˜(τ)dτ
}
Therefore if we have
(4.23)
α
κ
(
eκ(T−t)/(1+β) − 1
)
< E[x] ⇔ T − t <
1 + β
κ
ln
(
1 +
κ
α
E[x]
)
,
that is, if T − t is small enough, we have χ(s) = E[X(s)] ≥ 0 for all s ∈ [t, T ]. We can interpret
this smallness condition as saying that, on average, the initial reserves are not used up by time T .
Recalling that β = ǫ/2 and α = 1/2, we notice that condition (4.23) is equivalent to
T − t <
4 + 2ǫ
4 +
(
(1 + ǫ/2)(ν20 − µ)
2 + 4ν2
)
T
ln
(
1 +
1
2
(
4 + (1 + ǫ/2)(ν20 − µ)
2 + 4ν2
)
TE[x]
)
where the right-hand side is large when ǫ is large.
Additionally, we observe that
−π˜′ ≥ (ν20 − µ)π˜ −
1
1 + β
π˜2
using the fact that p˜ ≥ 0. Using the substitution u = π˜−1 we have
u′ ≥ (ν20 − µ)u−
1
1 + β
⇒ u(s) ≤
(
1 +
T − s
1 + β
)
e|ν
2
0
−µ|(T−s) ⇒ π˜(s) > 0 ∀ s ∈ [t, T ].
It follows that π is positive. Therefore, under condition (4.23) (in particular, for ǫ large enough
with respect to T ) we have that the expected market price
E[k¯(s)] =
1
2 + ǫ
−
2 + 2ǫ
2 + ǫ
eµ(s−t)
(
π(s)χ(s) +
∫ s
t
π(τ)dτ
)
is decreasing in ǫ and goes to zero as ǫ→∞.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the solution of a linear-quadratic mean field type control problem
with a common noise and a dependence on the conditional expectation of both state and control
variables. We then compared this to mean field games, where it is seen that in certain cases, the
two problems are the same, with a difference in the objective functionals which is called the price of
anarchy. We then applied this to an economic model of production of exhaustible resources. Since
it is natural for such aggregate quantities as the expected value of the control to appear in economic
models, it is useful to note that variational methods can be used to study the Nash equilibrium in
this case. It would be interesting to pursue this approach in future work on more general models
than the linear-quadratic setting.
References
[1] Y. Achdou, F. J. Buera, J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, and B. Moll, Partial differential equation models
in macroeconomics, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences, 372 (2014).
[2] Y. Achdou, F. Camilli, and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Mean field games: numerical methods for the planning
problem, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 50 (2012), pp. 77–109.
[3] Y. Achdou and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Mean field games: Numerical methods, SIAM Journal on Numerical
Analysis, 48 (2010), pp. 1136–1162.
[4] S. Ahuja, Wellposedness of mean field games with common noise under a weak monotonicity condition, SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 54 (2016), pp. 30–48.
[5] M. Bardi, Explicit solutions of some linear-quadratic mean field games, Networks and heterogeneous media, 7
(2012), pp. 243–261.
[6] D. Bauso, H. Tembine, and T. Basar, Robust mean field games with application to production of an exhaustible
resource, in Robust Control Design, vol. 7, 2012, pp. 454–459.
[7] J.-D. Benamou, G. Carlier, and F. Santambrogio, Variational mean field games, (2016).
[8] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, Mean field games and mean field type control theory, Springer, 2013.
[9] , On the interpretation of the master equation, arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.07754, (2015).
[10] A. Bensoussan, K. Sung, S. Yam, and S. P. Yung, Linear-quadratic mean field games, Journal of Optimiza-
tion Theory and Applications, (2011), pp. 1–34.
[11] R. Buckdahn, B. Djehiche, J. Li, S. Peng, et al., Mean-field backward stochastic differential equations: a
limit approach, The Annals of Probability, 37 (2009), pp. 1524–1565.
[12] R. Buckdahn, J. Li, and S. Peng, Mean-field backward stochastic differential equations and related partial
differential equations, Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 119 (2009), pp. 3133–3154.
[13] M. Burger, L. Caffarelli, and P. A. Markowich, Partial differential equation models in the socio-economic
sciences, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering
Sciences, 372 (2014), p. 20130406.
[14] P. Cardaliaguet, Notes on mean field games, from P.-L. Lions lectures at College de France, (2010).
[15] ,Weak solutions for first order mean field games with local coupling, arXiv preprint arXiv:1305.7015, (2013).
[16] P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasry, and P.-L. Lions, The master equation and the convergence
problem in mean field games, arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.02505, (2015).
[17] P. Cardaliaguet and P. J. Graber, Mean field games systems of first order, ESAIM: COCV, 21 (2015),
pp. 690–722.
[18] P. Cardaliaguet, P. J. Graber, A. Porretta, and D. Tonon, Second order mean field games with de-
generate diffusion and local coupling, Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEA, 22 (2015),
pp. 1287–1317.
[19] P. Cardaliaguet, A. R. Me´sza´ros, and F. Santambrogio, First order mean field games with density
constraints: Pressure equals price, arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.02019, (2015).
[20] R. Carmona and F. Delarue, Probabilistic analysis of mean-field games, SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 2705–2734.
[21] R. Carmona and F. Delarue, The master equation for large population equilibriums, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1404.4694, (2014).
[22] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, et al., Forward–backward stochastic differential equations and controlled mckean–
vlasov dynamics, The Annals of Probability, 43 (2015), pp. 2647–2700.
21
[23] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, and A. Lachapelle, Control of mckean–vlasov dynamics versus mean field games,
Mathematics and Financial Economics, 7 (2013), pp. 131–166.
[24] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, and D. Lacker, Mean field games with common noise, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1407.6181, (2014).
[25] R. Carmona, J.-P. Fouque, and L.-H. Sun, Mean field games and systemic risk, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1308.2172, (2013).
[26] P. Chan and R. Sircar, Bertrand and Cournot mean field games, Applied Mathematics & Optimization,
(2014), pp. 1–37.
[27] , Fracking, renewables & mean field games, Available at SSRN 2632504, (2015).
[28] D. Gomes, R. M. Velho, and M.-T. Wolfram, Socio-economic applications of finite state mean field games,
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences,
372 (2014), p. 20130405.
[29] D. A. Gomes et al., Mean field games modelsa brief survey, Dynamic Games and Applications, pp. 1–45.
[30] P. J. Graber, Optimal control of first-order Hamilton–Jacobi equations with linearly bounded Hamiltonian,
Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 70 (2014), pp. 185–224.
[31] P. J. Graber and A. Bensoussan, Existence and uniqueness of solutions for Bertrand and Cournot mean field
games, arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.05408, (2015).
[32] O. Gue´ant,Mean field games and applications to economics, PhD thesis, PhD thesis, Universite´ Paris-Dauphine,
2009.
[33] , A reference case for mean field games models, Journal de mathe´matiques pures et applique´es, 92 (2009),
pp. 276–294.
[34] , Mean field games equations with quadratic hamiltonian: a specific approach, Mathematical Models and
Methods in Applied Sciences, 22 (2012), p. 1250022.
[35] O. Gue´ant, J.-M. Lasry, and P.-L. Lions, Mean field games and applications, in Paris-Princeton Lectures
on Mathematical Finance 2010, Springer, 2011, pp. 205–266.
[36] M. Huang, P. E. Caines, and R. P. Malhame´, Individual and mass behaviour in large population stochastic
wireless power control problems: centralized and nash equilibrium solutions, in Decision and Control, 2003.
Proceedings. 42nd IEEE Conference on, vol. 1, IEEE, 2003, pp. 98–103.
[37] , Large-population cost-coupled lqg problems with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decen-
tralized ε-nash equilibria, Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 52 (2007), pp. 1560–1571.
[38] , Social certainty equivalence in mean field lqg control: social, nash and centralized strategies, Proc. 19th
Mathematical Theorey of Networks and Systems (MTNS), Budapest, (2010).
[39] , Social optima in mean field lqg control: centralized and decentralized strategies, Automatic Control, IEEE
Transactions on, 57 (2012), pp. 1736–1751.
[40] M. Huang, R. P. Malhame´, and P. E. Caines, Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop
mckean-vlasov systems and the nash certainty equivalence principle, Communications in Information & Systems,
6 (2006), pp. 221–252.
[41] A. Lachapelle, Human crowds and groups interactions: a mean field games approach, (2010).
[42] A. Lachapelle, J. Salomon, and G. Turinici, Computation of mean field equilibria in economics, Mathe-
matical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences, 20 (2010), pp. 567–588.
[43] A. Lachapelle and M.-T. Wolfram, On a mean field game approach modeling congestion and aversion in
pedestrian crowds, Transportation research part B: methodological, 45 (2011), pp. 1572–1589.
[44] D. Lacker, A general characterization of the mean field limit for stochastic differential games, Probability
Theory and Related Fields, (2014), pp. 1–68.
[45] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions, Jeux a` champ moyen. i–le cas stationnaire, Comptes Rendus Mathe´matique,
343 (2006), pp. 619–625.
[46] , Jeux a` champ moyen. ii–horizon fini et controˆle optimal, Comptes Rendus Mathe´matique, 343 (2006),
pp. 679–684.
[47] , Mean field games, Japanese Journal of Mathematics, 2 (2007), pp. 229–260.
[48] J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, O. Gue´ant, et al., Application of mean field games to growth theory, (2008).
[49] M. Lauriere and O. Pironneau, Dynamic programming for mean-field type control, Comptes Rendus Math-
ematique, 352 (2014), pp. 707–713.
[50] S. T. Li and J.-F. Zhang, Asymptotically optimal decentralized control for large population stochastic multiagent
systems, Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 53 (2008), pp. 1643–1660.
[51] P.-L. Lions, The´orie des jeux de champ moyen et applications (mean field games), Cours du College de France.
http://www. college-de-france. fr/default/EN/all/equ der/audio video. jsp, 2009 (2007).
[52] R. E. Lucas Jr and B. Moll, Knowledge growth and the allocation of time, tech. report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2011.
22
[53] A. R. Me´sza´ros and F. J. Silva, A variational approach to second order mean field games with density
constraints: the stationary case, Journal de Mathe´matiques Pures et Applique´es, 104 (2015), pp. 1135–1159.
[54] Y.-H. Ni, J.-F. Zhang, and X. Li, Indefinite mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control, Automatic
Control, IEEE Transactions on, 60 (2015), pp. 1786–1800.
[55] H. Pham, Linear quadratic optimal control of conditional mckean-vlasov equation with random coefficients and
applications, arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.06609, (2016).
[56] H. Pham and X. Wei, Bellman equation and viscosity solutions for mean-field stochastic control problem, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1512.07866, (2015).
[57] , Dynamic programming for optimal control of stochastic mckean-vlasov dynamics, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1604.04057, (2016).
[58] H. Tembine, Q. Zhu, T. Basar, et al., Risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games, in Proc. 18th
IFAC World Congress, vol. 11, 2011, pp. 35–80.
[59] T. Yang, P. G. Mehta, and S. P. Meyn, A mean-field control-oriented approach to particle filtering, in
American Control Conference (ACC), 2011, IEEE, 2011, pp. 2037–2043.
[60] J. Yong, Linear-quadratic optimal control problems for mean-field stochastic differential equations, SIAM journal
on Control and Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 2809–2838.
[61] J. Yong and X. Y. Zhou, Stochastic controls: Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations, vol. 43, Springer
Science & Business Media, 1999.
International Center for Decision and Risk Analysis, Naveen Jindal School of Management, The
University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Rd, SM30, Richardson, TX 75080-3021, Phone:
(972) 883-6249
E-mail address: pjg140130@utdallas.edu
23
